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ABSTRACT
‘I am German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose’. With 
this powerful statement Mesut Özil resigned from Germany’s national 
football team. His resignation act not only highlights growing contro-
versies and uneasiness around the representation of the football nation 
by players with migration backgrounds, but also marks the fragility of 
national belonging. In this article, we deconstruct in detail Özil’s pow-
erful resignation elaborating upon Norbert Elias and John Scotson’s 
(1994 (1965)) ‘established–outsider model’. With this, we will analyse 
the power dynamics underlying the processes of national belonging. 
Moreover, we extend the established-outsider approach by using the 
fluid and contextual borders between formal and moral deservedness 
of citizenship. In our conclusion, we revisit Özil’s statement and reca-
pitulate our theoretical explanations on the sensitivities of this case as 
well on how to navigate a way out of the contested competition 
between nationalities in the context of international football.
‘I have two hearts, one German and one Turkish’
For years, the talented Arsenal-midfielder Mesut Özil was one of the key players in the 
German national football team. Özil, born, raised, and schooled in the German city of 
Gelsenkirchen as a third-generation Turkish immigrant,1 is a practicing Muslim who recites 
from the Quran when he enters the field (Merkel 2014) and who considers himself to be a 
blend of both of his cultures; ‘Whilst I grew up in Germany, my family background has its 
roots firmly based in Turkey. I have two hearts, one German and one Turkish’ (Özil 2018). 
Because Özil is a German-born of Turkish descent, he was eligible to play for both national 
football teams. After long considerations with his family, being torn back and forth between 
the two countries, he finally decided to play for Germany (Özil 2017). What is more, to 
make this possible, he had to legally renounce his Turkish passport, which, arguably, can 
be considered as an ultimate act of formally distancing himself from Turkey and, simulta-
neously, expressing his formal - and arguably moral - belonging to the state of Germany. 
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Soon after, probably also because of the high societal status of the German national football 
team, Özil was regarded as one of Germany’s ‘model minorities’ (Kalman-Lamb 2013). To 
illustrate, he won a so-called Bambi Award2 in the category ‘Integration’ in 2010 (Martin 
2010; Özil 2017; 2018), and was publicly voted German footballer of the year five times 
between 2011 and 2016 (Freemantle 2018).
Yet, the take on Mesut Özil radically changed from a ‘German Bambi’ to an imagined 
‘Turkish grey wolf ’ when he, together with his German-Turkish teammate Ilkay Gündogan, 
posed with Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in front of the media a month before 
the start of the 2018 football World Cup (Freemantle 2018; Hirsch 2018). Suddenly, Özil’s 
‘Germanness’ became topic of big national dispute. Where many Germans saw in Özil’s 
action ‘support for an increasingly autocratic ruler’ (Freemantle 2018), for Özil it was a 
matter of paying respect to highest office of his family’s country (Özil 2018). Things, how-
ever, really came to a head after Germany’s early knock-out in the group stage of the 2018 
football World Cup when, especially, Özil, one of the stars of the team, became the conve-
nient scapegoat for the disappointing results of the entire ‘Mannschaft’ (Hirsch 2018; Özil 
2018). While football connoisseurs seemed to comment on Özil’s football performances 
only, the criticisms in the public debate went beyond this and were also directed at his 
cultural allegiance with Turkey and the Turkish nation. As a consequence of all the contro-
versies around him, Özil resigned from the German national football team on July 22, 2018 
by placing a three-parted statement, in English, on his Instagram and Twitter profiles (fig-
ure 1). In this statement, Özil marked out the precariousness of national belonging by 
claiming ‘I am German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose’ (Özil 2018).3
Özil’s statement for us is a most interesting case to question not only who belongs to 
which (football) nation, but also who deserves to represent the football nation. ‘With deserve 
we not necessarily point to football qualities per se. For in many ways, this deserving ques-
tion seems a no-brainer for the average football fan, as we are, as the answer would be the 
best players of the nation, obviously. To answer that question, it is of importance to verify 
which players are considered the best in terms of football capabilities, which is and will 
obviously be a big topic of debate, and it requires verifying which football players are (for-
mally) eligible to play for which national football team. But, as Özil’s example clarifies, this 
is not where it stops. The question of deserving also seems to be a moral issue. Players with 
dual citizenship or footballers with migration backgrounds, seem to carry the extra burden 
of having to prove to unquestionably belong to the nation, to be the model-citizen, at the 
risk of being seen as untrustworthy or even a traitor if not.
Using Özil’s case as an example throughout this paper, we aim to understand who, under 
what conditions, are accepted as representatives of the football nation and are recognised 
as (conditionally and temporally) belonging to the nation. To this end, in the first part of 
the paper, we sketch the regulations and its implications of national representation in inter-
national football, and how this complicates the debates on national belonging of players 
with migration backgrounds. In the second part, as a prelude to discussing moral belonging 
to the (football) nation, we will introduce and critically engage with Elias and Scotson’s 
(1994 (1965)) established–outsider model, to shed light on the power dynamics between 
the established and outsiders in the representation of the football nation. In the third part 
of the paper, we will extend this establish-outsider framework to discuss the dynamic moral 
negotiations around the acceptance and recognition of players with migration backgrounds. 
We will end by going back to the main character of our plot, Mesut Özil, and reflect upon, 
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with the theoretical insights gained, how this painful rupture, in which there seem to be no 
winners, only losers, could have happened, and maybe could be prevented in the future.
‘Who did I want to play for if the possibility ever came about?’
It has been argued in the literature that one of the reasons why the issue of national belonging 
in international football ‘is so sensitive is because international sporting competitions, such 
as the Olympic Games and the football World Cup, have become a ‘magnifying lens through 
which critical elaborations of the idea of the nation come to the fore’ (Mauro 2020, 5). The 
competition between nations, including the coinciding performativity of cheering for ‘your’ 
nation, with all its theatrical elements of a stadium, flag-waving, winners and losers, (tem-
porally) provides ‘a uniquely effective medium for inculcating national feelings’ (Hobsbawm 
1992, 143) and for one’s patriotic place attachment, one’s topophilia (Van Houtum and Van 
Figure 1. Mesut Özil’s statement on his resignation from Germany’s national football team (Özil 2018).
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Figure 1. Continued
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Dam 2002). As Alan Bairner (2001, 17) argues: ‘It [international sports] provides a form of 
symbolic action which states the case for the nation itself ’. Moreover, it emphasises the 
enduring relevance of Eric Hobsbawm’s (1992, 143) observations that ‘sportsmen [sic] rep-
resenting their nation or state’ in international sporting competitions are ‘primary expres-
sions of their imagined communities’, and that ‘the imagined community of millions seems 
more real as a team of eleven named people’. The national make-believe show that a football 
competition between nations allows for, is a seductive phantasy-reality that comfortably 
borders and orders the at times chaotic world, even if it is only temporal, and creates an 
amusing and carnavelesque feeling of seemingly innocent togetherness (Van Houtum 2010; 
Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). It makes the imagined community (Anderson 1983), 
the ‘we’ of the nation feel ‘real’ (Hobsbawm 1992), at least for some time, provided of course 
that the national football team performs well, as the ecstasy of national togetherness works 
best on success (Van Houtum 2010).
Figure 1. Continued
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But who is included in this ‘we’? Who or what defines the formal borders of the football 
nation? It seems that within the nationalistic context of international football these borders 
are of an inflexible, dichotomic nature. Fluidity in terms of multiple nationality does not 
seem to exist. It really is either-or: ‘one can either be Dutch or Surinamese, or French or 
Moroccan, but not both’ (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001, 10). The regulations of the, the reg-
ulations of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) around the eligi-
bility of players to play for representative teams forces footballers with dual nationality to 
choose a national football team (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Seiberth, Thiel, and 
Spaaij 2019). Having dual nationality, also Özil (2017, 42) had to address this issue and 
struggled with making his decision: ‘Who did I want to play for if the possibility ever came 
about? For the German national side or the Turkish one? It wasn’t a decision I made in a 
couple of minutes, just in passing’. Deciding on one’s sporting nationality is often hard for 
players with dual nationality as it feels like choosing between ‘your’ two countries. Moreover, 
being permanent, it is a decision that fundamentally shapes their whole career in football 
(Özil 2017, 42), and one that will, regardless of the outcome, upset people. Özil experienced 
the impact of this forced decision first-hand after he chose in favour of Germany and, against 
his will, ‘publicly became a bone of contention between Germany and Turkey’ (Özil 
2017, 46).
It could be argued that to organise international sports competitions, like the football 
World Cup, solely around the principles of (legal) nationality, is principally sustaining a rigid 
‘inter-state world view’ (Mauro 2020, 2); something that Wimmer and Schiller (2003, 576) 
refer to as ‘methodological nationalism’ and John Agnew (1994) has referred to as’ the terri-
torial trap’. FIFA’s eligibility regulations are, arguably, not only insensitive to the growth of 
internationalisation overall but also seem to camouflage that, on average per edition of the 
football World Cup since 1930, nearly 10% of the players can be counted as ‘foreign-born’ 
(Van Campenhout et al. 2018, 1079); meaning that these players compete for another national 
football team than the one of their country of birth. The 23-headed selection of Morocco’s 
2018 national football team, for example, existed of 17 foreign-born players (74%), with the 
majority of these players born in European countries like France and the Netherlands (Van 
Campenhout and Van Sterkenburg 2019). Further, a review of the 2018 victorious ‘French 
national football team’s roster reveals its multiculturality, as 19 out of the 23 players had a 
‘genuine connection’ with a country other than France’ (Van Campenhout and Van Sterkenburg 
2019, 2); most of them with roots in one of France its former African colonies. In a similar 
vein, England’s prospect players such as Declan Rice (Republic of Ireland), Callum Hudson-
Odoi (Ghana), Dele Alli (Nigeria), and James Tarkowski (Poland) all have genuine migration 
backgrounds and, therefore, could have opted to pledge their sporting allegiance to another 
country (Ronay 2019). The strategic implication of the increasing numbers of (young) football 
players with dual nationality is, as can be expected, that national football federations increas-
ingly attempt to select these talented prospects as young as possible and to secure their sporting 
nationality by letting them play in an A-status match of their national football team (Iorwerth, 
Hardman, and Jones 2014; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019).
The consequence of this nationalised perspective on international football is that the 
decision on national deservedness then is not only a sportive one but by and large also a 
political one. And is made to depend on formal regulations as well as on a range of arbitrary 
and invisible moral norms and (cultural) markers, which are socially constructed by the 
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established ‘insiders’, that ‘outsiders’ have to accumulate (Hage 1998; Jansen 2020, 101; Loyal 
2011; Pratsinakis 2018, 6; Monforte, Bassel, and Khan 2019; Skey 2011). To this power 
struggle in defining insiders from outsiders, we turn now.
‘I am still not accepted into society. I am treated as being ‘different’’
In their canonical work The Established and the Outsiders, Elias and Scotson (1994 (1965)) 
studied the uneven balance of power between dominant (‘established’) and subordinate 
(‘outsider’) group(s) within a community near the English city of Leicester in the 1960s. 
They found that the power ratio between the established and outsider groups was based on 
the notable distinction in ‘length of residence’ in the area; whereby the former were (long-
term) residents while the latter were relatively new to the area (Black 2016; Dunning and 
Hughes 2014; Hughes and Goodwin 2016; Pratsinakis 2018). In addition, Elias and Scotson 
pointed to the importance of understanding the mutual entanglement processes between 
natives and newcomers, and argued, drawing on Elias’ earlier figurational approach, that 
human relationships should be seen as interdependent and in a constant state of flux and 
transformation (Dunning and Hughes 2014; Hughes and Goodwin 2016; Loyal 2011). 
Borders between people, in other words, as also recent literature in border studies has made 
clear, are not to be seen as fixed and permanent lines, but as discursive power struggles, 
with room for interpretation, negotiation and hence also as a window of opportunity (Van 
Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). Borders, Orders 
and Others should therefore be seen as processes, rather than ends, and hence as verbs 
rather than nouns: b/ordering and othering (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002).
Despite, or maybe even because, of its rather straightforward established-outsiders dichotomy 
(Bloyce and Murphy 2007), the established-outsider model has proven to be a conductive frame-
work to analyse these processes of ‘b/ordering’ and ‘othering’ (Black 2016; Pratsinakis 2018; Van 
Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). The established-outsider framework has been used to study 
a wide range of social phenomena, also within sport studies, to illustrate unequal power balances 
related to processes of globalisation (Maguire and Falcous 2011), race relations (Black 2016; Van 
Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019), gender inequalities (Liston 2005; Black and 
Fielding-Lloyd 2019), and (national) identities (Engh, Agergaard, and Maguire 2013; Jansen 2020).
A key element in the model is the explanation of processes of domination and discrim-
ination, that together continuously (re)construct the differential in the power ratio between 
groups (Loyal 2011, 188). The most powerful groups are able to (re)construct ‘understand-
ings of self that posit them as having superior human value’ and in doing so (implicitly) 
define the characteristics to those of the outsider groups (Engh, Agergaard, and Maguire 
2013, 783). The dominant position is mainly upheld by the established group’s social cohe-
sion and is displayed through subtle or not so subtle acts of exclusion – in example setting 
(invisible) norms of standard behaviour (Duemmler 2015) – and forms of shame and stigma 
– like daily gossip and (public) humiliation – directed at various outsider groups. Often, 
such acts of ‘othering’ can be seen as a response by people belonging to the dominant group 
to subjective feelings of threat from (national) outsiders (Pratsinakis 2018; Skey 2010, 2011). 
It is through these everyday ‘b/ordering and ordering’ practices that the dominant group 
(re)constructs the (cultural) boundaries of belonging.
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Still, in today’s world, the determination of who is ‘we’ and who are ‘they’ and who are 
‘in’ and ‘out’ is dominantly bordered along national lines (Yuval-Davis 2011; Yuval-Davis, 
Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). It is not that (national) identities can (still, if it ever could) 
only or foremost be grounded on a supposedly naturally existing world of mutually exclusive 
nation-states (Skey 2010, 2011; Wimmer and Schiller 2003), but what matters here is that 
these national identities are still imagined to dominantly define the conditions of belonging 
(Skey 2010): they are imagined and therefore real communities (Anderson 1983). As 
Benedict Anderson (1983, 6) famously has put it, a nation ‘is imagined because the members 
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. The thus 
socially constructed cultural boundary-makers are prescribed as the national normality, as 
real and existing model norms and tested among the newcomers (in example through 
citizenship exams) (Duemmler 2015; Skey 2010). The newcomers, such as foreign-born 
footballers, in their turn, precisely because the conditions of national belonging are ‘con-
tinuously negotiated, since social actors engage in struggles over social categories and dis-
tinctions’ (Duemmler 2015, 4), may ‘negotiate their position by presenting and adapting 
their behaviour in particular ways in order to gain access to established domains’ (Black 
2016, 984). Interestingly, as Elias earlier had made clear in his writings (Elias 1978 (1970)), 
an everyday indication of power struggles on belonging and representation is self-identi-
fication. How and when personal pronouns – such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, she’, ‘we’ and ‘they’ – are 
used, could be giveaways of figurative acts of b/ordering and othering (Van Houtum and 
Van Naerssen 2002).
In his resignation letter, Özil (2018) implicitly refers to his experiences of the power 
struggles between (ethnic) groups of people within German society arguing – and also 
explicitly using personal pronouns to illustrate the power figurations – that ‘I am still not 
accepted into society’ and it feels that ‘I am treated as being ‘different’’. Özil wonders whether 
his family’s country (Turkey) or the fact that he is a practising Muslim might be reasons to 
‘other’ him from the German nation. Moreover, Özil (2018) seems to be amazed that his 
position in German society has changed over time and that he recently has become posi-
tioned as an outsider to the German nation by proclaiming: ‘I was born and educated in 
Germany, so why don’t people accept that I am German?’
What these statements on national belonging illustrate is the inability of (individual) 
outsiders – even those who previously had the power to negotiate their position into estab-
lished domains like Özil – to become or remain accepted and recognised as ‘fully’ belonging 
to the nation. Some outsiders might, depending on the situational conditions, be accepted 
as ‘established-outsiders’, yet in other contexts or for other people, some of their personal 
characteristics will still mark them as outsiders to the imagined (comm)unity of the nation 
(Black 2016; Dunning and Hughes 2014; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 
2019). Or as Michael Skey (2010, 718) has argued, we ‘must attend to the different ways in 
which membership categories are contextually negotiated and transformed over time, [and] 
we must also acknowledge the degree to which distinctions continue to be drawn between 
different groups, with some seen to be more national than others’. So, what Özil’s case alludes 
to, is that there seems to be a crucial difference between formal and moral citizenship that 
can vary over time as well over different kinds of outsider groups that needs to be studied 
further (Schinkel 2017), an insight that could further enrich the established-outsider 
approach. To this, we turn next.
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‘I had to ask myself what I was, or what I wanted to be, on paper at least’
In a formal sense, legal nationality or citizenship can be regarded as a political relationship 
between an individual and a state in which a ‘citizen’ has certain duties and obligations to 
a state and in return enjoys certain rights within the legal borders of that state. In terms of 
power figurations, it is a state’s government that decides on a country’s citizenship regimes 
and therefore holds the power to grant citizenship to individuals (Iorwerth, Hardman, and 
Jones 2014). ‘Formal citizenship’, according to Ghassan Hage (1998, 50), ‘can reflect a prac-
tical mode of national belonging’. This, however, only occurs ‘in the ideal situation where 
the formal decision to include a person as a citizen reflects a general communal will’ (Hage 
1998, 50). Besides its formal dimension, citizenship suggests that citizens of the same state 
are members of the aforementioned (imagined), socially constructed, political community: 
the nation. This idea of an imagined-and-therefore-real nation reflects the moral dimension 
of citizenship which can be considered as a personal and collective form of identification 
with people who perceive themselves as part of the same group. And imagined communities 
will often be, then, communities of value in which some members are considered to be of 
higher value, more deserving its membership than others (Anderson 1983; Schinkel 2017).
In a similar vein, Hage (1998, 51) analytically distinguishes between institutional-political 
national acceptance of belonging, referring to legal membership of a state, and practical-cul-
tural national acceptance of belonging relating to derivatives of the nation like (practical) 
nationality. Where the former refers to the power of the state to legally accept and recognise 
outsiders as belonging to the state [related to formal citizenship], the latter can be understood 
as – in line with Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of ‘social and cultural capital’– ‘the sum of accu-
mulated nationally sanctified and valued social and physical cultural styles and dispositions 
(national culture) adopted by individuals and groups, as well as valued characteristics 
(national types and national character) within a national field: looks, accent, demeanour, 
taste, nationally valued social and cultural preferences and behaviour, etc.’ [related to moral 
citizenship] (Hage 1998, 53).
The idea of moral citizenship, that what we bring forward here, is helpful in making clear 
that ‘formal citizenship alone’, to use the words of Joost Jansen (2020, 102), ‘is often not a 
sufficient prerequisite for immigrants, or even the children of immigrants, to be recognised 
as fully ‘integrated’ members of the (national) society’. Being born on the nation’s territorial 
soil seems to be an insufficient criterium then for second, third, or even fourth generation 
immigrants to be accepted as fully belonging to the nation (Jansen 2020). So, while formal 
‘recognition and acknowledgment of one’s rights and one’s belonging become pivotal for 
the final grounding of one’s belonging’ (Kryżanowski and Wodak 2008, 104), ‘“citizenship” 
in a highly moralized sense has become a marker to identify membership of society’ 
(Schinkel 2017, 197). It also implies, that using the notion of citizenship simply as a synonym 
or in association with national belonging would thus not do justice to capture this moral 
dimension and the inherent ‘subtleties of the differential modalities of national belonging as 
they are experienced within society’ (Hage 1998, 51). Both dimensions of national accep-
tance of belonging, the formal and the moral, are thus important in understanding power 
figurations between the established and outsider.
As formal German citizenship law did not (yet) allow dual nationality, and Özil stood 
on the brink of an international football career, ‘I [Özil] had to ask myself what I was, or 
what I wanted to be, on paper at least’ (Özil 2017, 42). By giving up his Turkish passport 
SPOrT IN SOCIETy 11
in order to acquire a German one, Özil (2017, 44) formally expressed his (national) belong-
ing to the German state and nation and, as a consequence, decided in favour of Germany’s 
national football team. Özil’s decision on his formal and sporting nationality was, accord-
ing to himself, ‘not an explicit rejection of Turkey. Just because I’d chosen to play for 
Germany didn’t mean that Turkey wasn’t close to my heart. I wasn’t shutting myself off 
from Turkey and its people’ (Özil 2017, 47). Özil ‘changed’ his nationality mainly because 
FIFA’s eligibility regulations forced him to make a decision between his two countries 
(Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019): ‘I had to make the decision about whether I wanted to 
play for Germany or Turkey. Logically I had to opt for one or the other; there was no way 
around it’ (Özil 2017, 50). This in itself, should not necessarily be a problem. However, 
as we have seen, it is precisely the moral dimension of national belonging that has become 
pivotal in the whole discussion on Özil’s ‘Germanness’, and which in the end has caused 
the rupture between him, as a native German, and his performances for the German 
national football team.
Özil’s case is by no means an exception, but rather the rule. Many football players with 
migration backgrounds are, or have been, subject to public value judgments regarding their 
eligibility and loyalty to the (football) nation (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 
2019). In the eyes of Özil (2018), several German newspapers crossed a personal line (‘one 
that should never be crossed’) when ‘they didn’t critique my performances, they didn’t 
criticise the team’s performances, they just criticised my Turkish ancestry and respect for 
my upbringing’. Further, by repeatedly asking questions directed at specific practical-cultural 
markers of belonging, such as loyalty, pride, and affection, the media – as both part and 
representatives of the established – try to tacitly ‘other’ players with migration backgrounds 
thereby simultaneously ‘b/ordering’ an imaginary of the ‘true’ nation (Pratsinakis 2018; 
Skey 2010). As a consequence of these mutual processes of b/ordering and othering, players 
with migration backgrounds need to constantly prove their allegiance to the nation – some-
thing native players never have to – and show that they deserve to become or remain 
accepted and recognised as part of the nation (Hage 1998; Pratsinakis 2018).
‘Are there criteria for being fully German that I do not fit?’
The (increasing) discrepancy between formal and moral citizenship can be indicative of 
‘the crucial link between recognition and belonging and the unequal relations of power 
that exist in the attribution and acceptance of identity claims’ (Skey 2010, 718–719). In 
recent debates, in the processes of marking out ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’, particular atten-
tion is paid ‘to the continuing power of gendered, racist and classist categories to define 
who counts as truly national’ (Jansen 2020, 100), resulting in ‘powerful distinctions 
between different social groups within the nation’ (Skey 2011, 2). Whether outsiders are 
seen as ‘proper’ nationals thereby ‘remains largely dependent on the judgements and (re)
actions of others’ (Skey 2010, 719). Interestingly, certain outsiders are ‘able to position 
themselves (and are recognised) as unconditionally belonging to the nation’ (Hage 1998; 
Skey 2010, 718), which largely seems to depend ‘on the positions a person is assigned on 
various markers of difference and sameness, most notably those of race, ethnicity, culture, 
nation and religion’ (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019, 208). As these 
markers of difference and sameness differ per country, differences in hierarchies of 
national belonging exist between countries. Whereas, for example, in Germany, the 
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(German) Turks are, arguably, at the bottom of this hierarchy (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 
2019), this dubious honour seems to fall to (British) Asians in Great Britain (Clarke 2020). 
Further, as not all outsider groups have the power to accumulate enough (but when is 
enough?) national cultural capital, rankings of national belonging can also change over 
time. The result is that we are witnessing continuously shifting hierarchies of national 
belonging ranking different immigrant groups in relation to the dominant one (Clarke 
2020; Skey 2011). And how this, consequentially, has led to a competition for national 
acceptance and recognition between individuals and these groups (Pratsinakis 2018, 
13–14). For example, whereas the (Dutch) Surinamese were placed low bottom in terms 
of belonging to Dutch society in the 1970s/1980s, they have arguably moved up this hier-
archy due to an increased recognition of the colonial linkages between the two countries 
(Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006). In terms of ethnicity and nationality, although 
this is not uncontested, the (Dutch) Surinamese, are now dominantly seen as more ‘prop-
erly’ Dutch than the (Dutch) Moroccans and the (Dutch) Turks, indicating an overtime 
re-ordering within this hierarchy of national belonging in the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort 
and Van Niekerk 2006; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). Moreover, 
in most (West) European countries, non-western immigrants are quite often ‘less accepted 
and their categorization as culturally different burdens their interaction with the dominant 
society on many occasions’ (Pratsinakis 2018, 15). ‘Even in German elite football’, accord-
ing to Klaus Seiberth, Ansgar Thiel and Ramón Spaaij (2019, 788), ‘the treatment of 
German national players with a Turkish background also appears to still be different 
compared to members of other immigrant groups’.
Özil (2018) also explicitly addresses the issue of hierarchy among outsiders when he 
complains about the fact that ‘he is still labelled as a ‘German Turk’ even though he has 
been playing for Germany since the age of 17’ (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019, 788), 
whereas his foreign-born former-national teammates Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski 
were never referred to as ‘German Poles’ (Özil 2018; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019). 
Apparently, indeed, not all markers of national belonging are practically acquirable for every 
outsider or outsider group(s) at every moment or in any situation.
In today’s (international) football, in Western Europe but also elsewhere, obvious 
acts of stigmatisation mainly seem to happen to players whose ‘race/ethnicity’ – being 
easily identifiable markers – differs from the one of the dominant group. Besides 
German-Turkish players like Özil, similar forms of othering have been directed at black 
German football players, most of them having roots that can be traced back to different 
African countries, such as Gerald Asamoah (Ghana), David Odonkor (Ghana), and 
Patrick Owomoyela (Nigeria). It was, in particular, Hamburg-born Owomoyela who 
in 2006 became subject of ‘right-wing backlash’ as a calendar was produced showing 
‘the national shirt with Owomoyela’s squad number on it and the slogan: "White: not 
just the colour of the shirt! For a real National team!"’ (Merkel 2014, 246). Although 
biologically informed racism is ‘officially’ accepted to be not accepted, and other hidden 
forms of in/exclusion such as references to nationhood or religion have become more 
‘accepted’ (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019, 198), Owomoyela’s 
case does imply that race/ethnicity still remains one of the distinctive markers in deter-
mining who is ‘in’ or ‘out’; arguably, even overtaking someone’s place of birth in Western 
countries.
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‘You can definitely belong to two cultures. And you can certainly be proud of 
two cultures’
We come to a conclusion, after our close theoretical reading of Özil’s powerful resignment, 
by going back to his painful rupture with his ‘Germanness’ once more and then try to look 
ahead. Born in Germany as a child of second-generation Turkish immigrants, and since 
the age of seventeen only in the possession of  formal German citizenship, Mesut Özil felt 
that he was morally excluded from the German national football team after its dramatic 
2018 football World Cup. Özil’s resignation was a good example of the widespread tendency 
to portray the complex issues of citizenship and national identity in dichotomies; an ‘us 
versus them’, and a ‘here versus there’. Özil’s exemplary painful rupture has made clear that 
the arena of international football should come to terms in recognizing that feelings and 
experiences of national belonging of players with migration backgrounds are – at the very 
least – dual in the sense that they, in most cases, identify themselves with both their country 
of birth and the country of their family: ‘You can definitely belong to two cultures. And you 
can certainly be proud of two cultures’ (Özil 2017, 51). In addition, Özil’s recent public 
performances outside of football, especially the photo-posing with the Turkish leader 
Erdoğan which in itself may indeed be seen as politically clumsy given Erdoğan’s spiteful 
anti-western and autocratic leadership, did not necessarily have to backlash on his football 
affiliation. That it did, and to this extent, is telling for the power of moral deservedness for 
outsiders in the social construction of imagined communities.
Deservedness to represent the (football) nation seems to depend on the accumulated 
national cultural capital by players with migration backgrounds and the relentless demon-
strations of their loyalty, pride, and affection that would mark them as being ‘in’, as ‘one of 
us’. Further, as the established have the power to (re)construct and maintain the borders of 
national belonging, they are also powerful in deciding who morally deserves to belong to 
the (football) nation. Obviously, as both the established and outsiders are a constitutive part 
of the power balance determining national belonging (Pratsinakis 2018), then, arguably, 
both have the ability to, at least to a certain degree, and also the potential to change the 
borders of national belonging. What, however, then should be kept in mind is that Özil, 
like many other, especially non-Western, immigrants, will never be able to fully meet the 
current, prevailing conditions of Germany’s national belonging, which seem to be biased 
towards Western, Christian and White characteristics (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van 
Amsterdam 2019). This highlights the conditional and temporal character of national 
belonging. It is therefore that many individuals belonging to the second, or even third or 
fourth generation of non-western immigrants within their country of birth experience that 
‘their presence and acceptance as legitimate members of the nation remains contested’ 
(Kyeremeh 2020, 1137). The result is, that the acceptance and recognition of players with 
migration backgrounds will crucially be a matter of moral deservedness then, in the sense 
that their (national) belonging lasts as long as their performances on the field and in public 
are on (or above) the expected (invisible) norms set by the established: Only ‘if “we” win…’.
What Özil’s intriguing as well as most smarting case, above all, thus marks out is the fra-
gility of national belonging for multiple generations and naturalised migrants, even for players 
who have been selected, accepted and recognised as key persons to represent ‘the’ nation in 
international football. We would, therefore, argue that more research is needed towards the 
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power (re)figurations of the (invisible) norms of national belonging, and how these norms 
are experienced in practice by (various) outsiders and between different outsider groups. 
Further, we would be in favour of loosening the bounds of football nationality and to allow 
for more flexibility and interchangeability of football players in the context of international 
football. The current rather fixed eligibility regulations for players to play for representative 
teams (FIFA 2019) are out of touch with the growth in international migration, the diversi-
fication of societies, and the increasing acceptance of dual citizenship (Castels, de Haas, and 
Miller 2014; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). In this respect, we provocatively postulate 
here, it would be worthwhile to investigate to what extent international football could become 
(more) like club football, where footballers of different origins are, in most instances, accepted 
and (morally) recognised as ‘one of us’, as long they play – and perform well – for ‘our’ team.
Mesut Özil played for various teams in his life, also clubs who are competitors of each 
other in either domestic and international leagues, like FC Schalke 04, Werder Bremen, 
Real Madrid CF, and Arsenal FC. Barely ever did he have to show his undivided formal and 
moral belonging to the clubs he played for to the extent that he had to do for his selection 
to the German national football team.4 Never were there discussions on Özil’s assumed 
‘Schalkeness’, or whether he would be an Arsenal’ Wolf, or anything like it. Whether the 
team Özil played for won or lost, they would be in it together. As a team. Maybe, it is time, 
to rethink if we are winning really as a national football team, when the battle is not only 
or no longer an ‘us versus them’, ‘our national football team versus the other national football 
team’, but also an ‘us versus us’ within our national football teams.
Notes
 1. While Özil’s father grew up in Germany, his ancestors are from Devrek, located in the prov-
ince of Zonguldak in Turkey (Özil 2017).
 2. The Bambi Awards are Germany’s most important media prizes and have been awarded to 
‘people with vision and creativity, whose outstanding successes and achievements have been 
reported in the media’ (Martin 2010).
 3. Although this statement received a lot of media coverage, Özil’s remark is certainly not 
unique. There have been other players in international football and athletes in other interna-
tional sports who said similar things, like the French striker Karim Benzema, who has 
Algerian roots, in 2011: ‘Basically, if I score, I’m French. And if I don’t score or there are 
problems, I’m Arab’ (Rosenthal and Conrad 2014).
 4. Just recently, on October 21st 2020, Mesut Özil placed a statement on his Twitter account ex-
pressing his disappointment of not being registered as an Arsenal player for the Premier 
League season in which he literally pledges his loyalty and allegiance to the club he loves, 
Arsenal (Özil 2020).
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